Multisignature owners
Require several independently secured owners for high-value transfers and sensitive policy changes.
TKMChain smart accounts add multisignature approvals, spending limits, restricted session keys, delayed recovery, deterministic account creation, and application-sponsored transactions while staying compatible with the network's existing contract execution.
A smart account holds TKM and calls contracts like a normal account, but authorization is enforced by transparent contract rules instead of relying on one unrestricted key.
Require several independently secured owners for high-value transfers and sensitive policy changes.
Set a daily native-TKM limit and a high-value threshold that activates stronger signature requirements.
Authorize one target, function selector, time window, per-call value, and total value without exposing the primary owner key.
Recover lost access through a guardian threshold and mandatory delay, while existing owners retain time to cancel an attack.
Allow an application sponsor to approve short-lived operations for specific contract functions without gaining custody of user funds.
Calculate an account address before deployment through the factory's CREATE2 account creation process.
Stop normal account execution through an authorized self-call while recovery or key rotation is handled.
Every operation commits to its nonce, EntryPoint, chain ID, target, calldata, value, expiry, gas bound, and paymaster data.
Contract source, generated ABI, bytecode, RPC builders, CLI access, and security tests live together in go-tkmchain.
The feature stays above consensus. The final submission is an ordinary transaction that existing nodes validate using existing execution rules.
A wallet uses tkmaccount helpers to construct calldata and a chain-bound operation hash.
Owners or a narrowly restricted session key sign the operation. A sponsor may separately sign a paymaster permit.
A user or application relayer submits the signed operation to the EntryPoint as a normal contract transaction.
The EntryPoint checks nonce, expiry, gas bound and sponsorship; the account checks signatures, limits, sessions, and lock state.
The account transfers TKM or calls the chosen contract. A revert rolls the entire operation and policy accounting back atomically.
The pool treasury contract inherits the full smart-account policy system and starts with the public pool wallet as its initial owner. No password or private credential is embedded.
TKMPoolTreasurySmartAccount is designed to separate long-term treasury control from automated payout activity. The owner can add independently secured signers, raise the signature threshold, configure guardians, set limits, and issue a short-lived payout session.
The payout process should receive only the authority it needs: one payout contract, one function selector, a maximum per payout, a total budget, and a short expiry. It should never receive permission to modify account owners or recovery policy.
The contract is compiled and tested but has not been deployed. Do not send pool funds to any claimed smart-account address until deployment, bytecode, EntryPoint, ownership, and low-value operations have been independently verified.
The helper layer builds hashes and calldata. It does not unlock accounts, hold keys, sign operations, or submit transactions.
gtkm --http --http.addr 127.0.0.1 \
--http.api eth,net,web3,tkmaccount
gtkm smartaccount status \
/home/mike/.tkmchain/gtkm.ipc
RPC namespace: tkmaccount
Version: 1.0.0
Consensus: false
Hardfork: falseBuild operation hashes, execution calldata, account creation data, owner authorization, and session authorization.
Build owner, guardian, recovery, spending-limit, and session configuration calls.
Build chain-bound sponsor hashes and ABI-encoded short-lived sponsorship data.
Successful compilation and local tests are not an independent audit. Contracts should complete external review, public testnet operation, invariant fuzzing, and a bug bounty before protecting material funds.